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Enhanced Third Party Rights in the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding
By Antonis Antoniadis*
Abstract
This article examines the issue of enhanced third party rights in the WTO
DSU. The origin of broader participatory rights in the GATT practice is
explored. Further, in the early WTO jurisprudence and in particular, in
EC–Hormones, the Appellate Body determined the conditions under which
those rights should be granted and the content thereof. Their foundation
on the discretionary authority of the Panels and on considerations of due
process was thereby established. This contribution focuses on United States–
1916 Anti-Dumping Act, where the Appellate Body was offered the oppor-
tunity to elaborate on the issue in a case where claims of procedural prejudice
were raised. In light of the unsatisfactory response of the Appellate Body,
an analysis of the DSU provisions is undertaken and the argument that
enhanced third party rights have a strong basis in the DSU is advocated.
At the same time, the procedural and systemic importance of the issue is
highlighted. 
1.  Introduction
After seven and a half years of operation the World Trade Organization
(WTO)1 is at an important crossroads. The choice of direction will be decided
by two main factors: first, having been invested with the expectation that it
would act as a vehicle leading to global prosperity, its success in delivering
what it promised is withering, at least from the point of view of civil society.
Second, a deep identity crisis is looming within the Organization, this second
factor being the principal cause of the first. The identity crisis is, in itself,
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1. Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 ILM 1140
(1994) (hereinafter, WTO Agreement).
caused by divergent demands from several institutional and non-institutional
players. For example, academia would like to see the WTO becoming a
‘linkage’ Organization,2 the anti-globalization movement dynamically
questions its very object and purpose, the developing countries would like
to increase the systemic derogations in their favour so that account is taken
of their special needs and their right to development and finally, the devel-
oped countries, while wishing to increase their own prosperity by opening
up the world’s markets, fight in the WTO’s backyard for the title of the
best ambassador of the developing countries’ interests. 
The launch of the new Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations at
Doha, Qatar, is neither intended nor expected to resolve these fundamental
philosophical issues. On the contrary, its broad agenda is fraught with
matters left unresolved by the previous Round and problems raised in
the course of its operation. One of those is the reform of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU)3 which occupies a less than prominent
position on the agenda of the negotiations.4 The DSU, however, has had a
cardinal impact during the Organization’s first years and has attracted atten-
tion for the speed with which it handles the ever-increasing number of disputes
before it.5 It provided a strong input in the constitutionalization of interna-
tional trade by shaping the new trading regime and providing security and
predictability to the system.6 At the same time, its modus operandi repre-
sented a shift from the arbitral dispute settlement of the GATT to judicial
dispute settlement.7 Although it is generally acknowledged that the DSU
has been working miraculously well, it is recognized that there are several
shortcomings relating mainly to enforcement,8 private party participation,9
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2. Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, (2002) 96 AJIL 1-158.
3. Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
4. Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘Some Proposals for a Fundamental DSU Reform’, (2002) 29 LIEI 73. 
5. See ‘Symposium on the First Three Years of the WTO Dispute Settlement System’ in (1998)
32:3 The International Lawyer; ‘Special Issue: WTO Dispute Settlement System’ in (1998) 1
JIEL 175; William J. Davey, ‘Supporting the World Trade Organisation Dispute Settlement
System’, (2000) 34:1 JWT 167. 
6. Deborah Z. Cass, ‘The “Constitutionalization” of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-
Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade’, (2001) 12
EJIL 39.
7. John Collier and Vaughan Lowe, The Settlement of Diputes in International Law: Institutions and
Procedures, (OUP, 1999) at p. 103. See also an analysis on the nature of the WTO Dispute
Settlement in Cottier, ‘Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Characteristics
and Structural Implications for the European Union’, (1998) 35 CMLRev. 325 at pp. 333–350.
8. Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules – Toward
a More Collective Approach’, (2000) 94 AJIL 335.
9. Panel Discussion at the 6th Geneva Global Arbitration Forum: Petros C. Mavroidis, Thomas
Cottier, William J. Davey, Eleanor M. Fox, Gary N. Horlick, Norio Komuro and Douglas E.
Rosenthal, ‘Is the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Responsive to the Needs of the Traders?
Would a System of Direct Action by Private Parties Yield Better Results?’, (1998) 32:2 JWT
147. 
transparency,10 etc. The concept of transparency in the DSU has two faces,
the internal and the external. The latter has become the object of attention
mainly because of the lack of publicity in the proceedings and the decision
of the Appellate Body to accept amicus curiae briefs.11 The Appellate Body
attracted a lot of criticism for its choice to treat NGOs as de facto third
parties.12 Internally, the DSU contains several provisions that promote the
dissemination of information and full participation of all the WTO
Members.13 In this sense, it can be argued that the widely advertised prin-
ciple of transparency towards non-Members and the civil society in general,
is concomitant with the principle of due process and full participation afforded
to the WTO Members. 
Against the background of these considerations, the Appellate Body, in
United States–Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,14 upheld the Panel’s choice not to
grant Japan and the EC enhanced third party rights in each other’s case.
This case, which has been extensively considered in literature,15 dealt with
the conformity of the United States–Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 with the WTO
rules. The two separate complaints launched by the EC and Japan had the
same subject, namely the conformity of the 1916 Act with Article VI of the
GATT and several Articles of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In the alterna-
tive, the EC claimed that the respondents violated Article III:4 of the GATT
and Japan Article XI. Both the complainants won their principal claim and
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10. W.J. Davey, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement’ in Antonio Pérez van Kappel and Heusel Wolfgang
(eds.), Free World Trade and the European Union: the reconciliation of interests and the review of
the Understanding on Dispute Settlement in the Framework of the World Trade Organization (Series
of Publications by the Academy of European Law in Trier; Vol. 28), (Köln, 2000) at p. 57.
B. Jansen, ‘Selected Problem Areas in the Course of a Dispute Settlement Procedure’, in idem,
p. 61. K. Ito, ‘The Dispute Settlement Mechanism in the WTO – a Japanese Perspective’, in
idem, p. 96.
11. WT/DS138/AB/R, United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled
Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, paras. 39, 42;
WT/DS135/9, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing
Products. 
12. See Uruguay’s statement at the General Council of 22 November 2000 WT/GC/38 and Petros
C. Mavroidis, ‘The Meeting in Doha: Keep on Keeping On’, (2002) 36:2 JWT 167 at 168.
Also, A.E. Appleton, ‘Amicus Curiae Submissions in the Carbon Steel case: another rabbit from
the Appellate Body’s hat?’, (2000) 3 JIEL 691. 
13. Article 2(1), 3(6) and of course, 10(1) DSU. 
14. WT/DS136/AB/R and WT/DS162/AB/R.
15. For an analysis of the substantive aspects of the dispute see Jeffrey S. Beckington, ‘The World
Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Resolution in the United States – Anti-Dumping Act
of 1916’, (2001) 34 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 199; Philip De Keyser, ‘Exploring WTO dispute
settlement in US Anti-Dumping Act 1916: An easy case?’, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper
No. 7/99, <www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/013101.html>; Hiroko Yamane, ‘The Anti-
Dumping Act of 1916: a victory at what cost?’, (2001) 7 Int.T.L.R. 12; Laurent A. Ruessmann,
‘Implications of the WTO 1916 Act decision: Part 1: did the WTO outlaw the use of national
antitrust rules with regard to cross-border predatory pricing’, (2001) 7 Int.T.L.R. 143. 
the Panel decision became the object of an appeal by the United States. The
complainants cross-appealed jointly on the procedural issue of not having been
granted enhanced third party rights in each other’s case.16 This contribution
will discuss the issue of enhanced third party rights, analyze the decision of
the Appellate Body in US–1916 Anti-Dumping Act and assess it against past
GATT practice, the DSU provisions, the AB’s own previous jurisprudence and
the policy considerations briefly identified herein.
2.  Enhanced third party rights 
Although the concept of enhanced third party rights, found in the case law
as ‘additional’,17 ‘extended’,18 or ‘enhanced’ third party rights,19 is relatively
common in international trade jargon, its meaning and content lie beyond
any conceivable consensus in theory or practice. The importance of the matter,
however, cannot be doubted and it has been argued that no other topic
illustrates more clearly the distinction between a judicial and an arbitral process
than the rights of third parties to intervene.20
2.1.  GATT practice
The definition of the conditions for granting enhanced third party rights
and the extent of those rights is informed by the GATT practice.21 After
all, the GATT panel system, although ad hoc and consensual, was, generally
speaking, crowned with success in the adjudication of trade disputes. It was
therefore decided that the World Trade Organization would be guided by past
practice.22 During the operation of the GATT the content of third party rights
was not defined and, since there were no standard rules of procedure, the rules
governing the intervention of third parties in a dispute developed ad hoc. Third
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16. WT/DS136/R, United States–Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (complaint by the EC), at para. 6.36;
WT/DS162/R, United States–Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (complaint by Japan), at para. 6.35.
17. EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones).
18. EC – Measures Affecting the Importation, Distribution and Sale of Bananas.
19. US – 1916 Anti-Dumping Act.
20. Collier and Lowe, supra note 7 at p. 208.
21. For an analysis of GATT and early WTO practice see: Mary E. Footer, ‘Some Aspects of Third
Party Intervention in GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding’, in Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann (eds.), International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System
(Studies in Transnational Economic Law, Vol. 11), Kluwer Law International 1997 at
p. 213 ff. Another analysis of the issue from the point of view of substantial interest and mainly
connected to the Bananas Trilogy can be found in Chi Carmody, ‘Of Substantial Interest: Third
Parties Under GATT’ (1997) 18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 615.
22. Article XVI:1 of the Marakesh Agreement. Confirmed in WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages. See also, David Palmeter and Petros C.
Mavroidis, ‘The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law’ (1998) 92 AJIL 398 at 400–406.
party participation was reserved to all Contracting Parties that had an interest
in the dispute but ‘no specific procedural form was prescribed for third party
intervention’.23 The content of third party rights at the time extended from
submission of written statements and memoranda to participation in the
oral hearing. 
Apart from the standard third party rights recognized in the GATT practice,
enhanced third party rights were also accorded in several circumstances.24 In
particular, in the unadopted Panel Report on EC–Bananas I certain ACP coun-
tries intervening in favour of the EC were given the opportunity to attend
the meetings of the Panel, make a written submission, receive all submis-
sions of the parties and were invited to speak where appropriate.25 The same
treatment was reserved for third parties in EC–Bananas II.26 In Japan–Trade
in Semiconductors,27 a Panel established at the request of the European
Communities, the ‘United States became involved in the dispute as more than
just an “interested party”.’28 The Panel in that case exercised its discretion
to grant full participatory rights to the US considering that the object of
the dispute was the bilateral agreement between the US and Japan. Therefore,
the presence of the US and the provision of an opportunity for it to be
heard were indispensable to the proceedings.
On procedural grounds, the limits of participation for third parties seem
to have been the terms of reference of the Panel. In particular, while third
parties were allowed to participate ‘as necessary and appropriate’ to the
workings of the Panel, this did not include raising new claims or claims that
the parties could have raised but had chosen not to.29
2.2.  The Dispute Settlement Understanding
The drafters of the Dispute Settlement Understanding drew inspiration from
the previous GATT practice and the meaning and extent of intervention
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23. Footer, supra note 21, at p. 215.
24. Practice started with the Panel Report on EEC – Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products
from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region of 7 February 1985, L/5776, p. 2, para. 1.5
(unadopted) and continued in EEC – Member States’ Import Regime for Bananas of 3 June
1993, DS32/R, p. 2, para. 9 (Bananas I – unadopted) and EEC – Import Regime for Bananas
of 11 February 1994, DS38/R, p. 4, para. 8 (Bananas II – unadopted). The fact that those Panel
Reports remain unadopted does not reduce the guidance they offer as already accepted by the
Appellate Body in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages. More analytically, Footer, supra note
21, at pp. 229–235. Also, Carmody, supra note 21, at pp. 641–647. 
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Panel Report on Japan – Trade in Semiconductors, BISD 35S/116, 116–117, para. 5.
28. Footer, supra note 21, at p. 226.
29. Panel Report on United States – Customs User Fee, BISD 35S/245, at 290.
was addressed and enshrined in specific procedural rules.30 These rules are
integrated in Article 10 of the DSU, which states:
‘1. The interests of the parties to a dispute and those of other Members
under a covered agreement at issue in the dispute shall be fully
taken into account during the panel process.
2. Any Member having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel
and having notified its interest to the DSB (referred to in this
Understanding as a ‘third party’) shall have an opportunity to be
heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the panel.
These submissions shall also be given to the parties to the dispute
and shall be reflected in the panel report.
3. Third parties shall receive the submissions of the parties to the
dispute to the first meeting of the panel.
4. If a third party considers that a measure already the subject of a panel
proceeding nullifies or impairs the benefits accruing to it under
any covered agreement, that Member may have recourse to normal
dispute settlement procedures under this Understanding. Such a
dispute shall be referred to the original panel wherever possible.’
This Article reflects past GATT practice. Members, having a substantial
interest in proceedings, are allowed to participate with limited procedural
rights, which are restricted to attendance at the first meeting of the Panel.
This provision is supplemented by paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 (Working
Procedures) which provides that third parties shall be invited to present their
views in a session of the first substantive meeting of the Panel especially
dedicated to this and they shall be entitled to be present during the entirety
of the session. At the appellate stage, third parties may make written sub-
missions and shall be given an opportunity to be heard.31 In practice, third
parties fully participate during the Appellate stage. They are excluded, however,
from Panel proceedings under Articles 21.3 and 21.5 DSU and from Article
22.6 DSU arbitration. It should be emphasized that in WTO practice par-
ticipation of Members as third parties in proceedings has proved very popular.
At this stage, it is important to mention another form of intervention which
is relevant to the considerations raised, the procedure for multiple com-
plainants. It is very common in practice that a dispute starts with one
complainant and other Members later join as multiple complainants under
Antonis Antoniadis
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30. D.P. Steger and S.M. Hainsworth, ‘World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: The First
Three Years’, (1998) 1 JIEL 199.
31. Article 17.4 DSU.
Article 9 of the DSU.32 Usually, those other Members join the proceedings
at the stage of consultations and multiple requests for the establishment of
a Panel are made to the DSB. The DSB will join the complaints in
accordance with Article 9 of the DSU which describes the procedures for
multiple complainants.33 It states:
‘1. Where more than one Member requests the establishment of a Panel
related to the same matter, a single panel may be established to
examine these complaints taking into account the rights of all
Members concerned. A single panel should be established to examine
such complaints whenever feasible.
2. The single panel shall organize its examination and present its
findings to the DSB in such a manner that the rights which the
parties to the dispute would have enjoyed had separate panels
examined the complaints are in no way impaired. If one of the parties
to the dispute so requests, the panel shall submit separate reports
on the dispute concerned. The written submissions, by each of the
complainants shall be made available to the other complainants,
and each complainant shall have the right to be present when any
one of the other complainants presents its views to the panel.
3. If more than one panel is established to examine the complaints
related to the same matter, to the greatest extent possible the same
persons shall serve as panellists on each of the separate panels and
the timetable for the panel process in such disputes shall be har-
monized.’
Accordingly, when, as it invariably happens,34 WTO Members join the
proceedings at the consultation stage the single panel requirement shall be
satisfied. As a result, they enjoy the procedural rights prescribed in the second
half of paragraph 2 permitting them to receive the written submissions of
the other parties, to be present in the proceedings and to express their views
thereon. 
The relevance of Article 9 for third parties is highlighted in the circum-
stance that a third party considers that its rights under the covered agreements
are nullified or impaired and asks for the establishment of its own Panel
proceedings in accordance with Article 10(4) DSU. In exceptional circum-
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32. See, inter alia, United States – Reformulated Gasoline; Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages; United
States – Safeguard Measures on imports of fresh, chilled or frozen lamb meat from New Zealand
and Australia.
33. There is a shortcoming in this provision in that it only provides for multiple complainants and
there is no procedure for multiple defendants and their joinder in the proceedings. The issue
was raised in EC–Bananas and there is a suggestion that it should be addressed in a future reform
of the DSU. See cf. B. Jansen supra note 10 at p. 61.
34. In the totality of case law apart from the cases analyzed below.
stances, third parties that initiate their own proceedings on the same matter
may be unable for technical, temporal or other reasons, to follow the pattern
established by Article 9 DSU and take full advantage of the provisions encap-
sulated in it by joining the proceedings as multiple complainants in a single
Panel. In these cases, the Panels and Appellate Body are called upon to remedy
the problem and recognize the different treatment that could/should be
afforded to those parties. In the exercise of this duty the Panels and Appellate
Body are trying to reconcile the attributes of arbitration like confidentiality
and consent of the parties with those of judicial proceedings like trans-
parency and procedural fairness. In the context of these considerations the
issue of enhanced third party rights may also arise under the normative
framework of the DSU.
2.3.  Early WTO practice
Prior to US–1916 Anti-Dumping Act, the Appellate Body had two opportu-
nities to deal with the issue of enhanced third party rights. In EC–Bananas
III,35 the Panel granted broader participatory rights to all the parties inter-
vening in the case. These included permission to observe at the second
substantive meeting of the Panel and the right to make a brief statement at
a suitable time.36 The Panel based its decision, inter alia, on the following
considerations:
i) the economic effect of the disputed EC banana regime on certain third
parties appeared to be very large;
ii) the economic benefits to certain third parties from the EC banana regime
were claimed to derive from an international treaty between them and the
EC;
iii) past practice in panel proceedings involving the banana regimes of the
EC and its Member States; and
iv) the parties to the dispute could not agree on the issue.37
The next case, EC–Hormones, is of paramount importance because of the
examination of the concept of enhanced participatory rights, not strictly within
the context of classic third party intervention but from the perspective of
multiple but separate complainants. In that case, the United States requested
the establishment of a Panel against the EC on its import regime for hormone-
treated meat. During the proceedings, Canada, which had reserved its rights
as a third party, requested the establishment of its own Panel proceedings.
For temporal reasons, it was not feasible for the complaints to be joined in
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35. For a brief statement of the facts and the consideration of the issues on third party participa-
tion see Carmody, supra note 21, at pp. 641–647 and 657.
36. Panel Report on EC – Measures Affecting the Importation, Distribution and Sale of Bananas (com-
plaint by the USA), para. 7.8.
37. Ibid.
a single Panel, nevertheless, the Panels were comprised of the same panel-
lists. Each of the complainants requested enhanced third party rights in each
other’s case. The Panel agreed to their request. It held a joint meeting with
scientific experts and gave Canada access to all information submitted in
the United States’ proceeding. It also gave access to all information sub-
mitted in the Canadian proceedings to the United States and invited the
United States to observe and make a statement at the second substantive
meeting in the proceedings initiated by Canada.38
The EC made a claim of error in its appeal against the Panel decision.
The Appellate Body, after citing Article 9.3 of the DSU, held that there
were four aspects in this dispute that should be underlined, i.e., same matter,
same panellists, the Panel finished both reports at the same time and, given
the fact that the same panellists were conducting two proceedings dealing with
the same matter, neither Canada nor the United States were ordinary third
parties in each other’s complaint.39 It then split the issue in two dealing first
with the Panel’s choice to hold a joint meeting with scientific experts and
second, with the broader participatory rights given to the complainants. As
to the first, it concluded that it was consistent with the letter and spirit of
Article 9.3. DSU to hold a joint meeting for practical purposes.40 It went
on to analyze the participation of the United States in the second substan-
tive meeting of the Panel where, after citing the reasoning of the Panel, it
upheld it for reasons of due process. Indeed, the second substantive meeting
of the Panel in the US complaint took place before the meeting with the
experts. In the Canadian complaint it took place afterwards. The Panel and
Appellate Body considered, therefore, that it would be unfair for the United
States to be deprived of the same opportunity to comment on the views
expressed by the experts that the EC and Canada enjoyed.41 The Appellate
Body provided for three legal bases for those rights to be granted. First, the
discretion offered to the Panel under Article 12.1 of the DSU,42 second, the
permissive language of Article 10 and paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 of the DSU43
as was previously interpreted by the Appellate Body in EC–Bananas44 and
third, Article 9.3 of the DSU.45
Enhanced Third Party Rights in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
293
38. Appellate Body Report on EC–Hormones, para. 150.
39. Ibid., para. 151.
40. Ibid., paras 152–153
41. Ibid., para. 154.
42. ‘Panels shall follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 unless the Panel decides otherwise
after consulting the parties to the dispute’. 
43. ‘All third parties which have notified their interest in the dispute to the DSB shall be invited
in writing to present their views during a session of the first substantive meeting of the panel
set aside for that purpose. All such third parties may be present during the entirety of this
session.’
44. EC – Measures Affecting the Importation, Distribution and Sale of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R,
Appellate Body Report of 25 September 1997.
45. Appellate Body Report on EC–Hormones, para. 151.
It can be argued on the basis of the above that the Appellate Body’s under-
lying policy consideration was to uphold the Panel’s choice46 and give the
parties the right to participate fully in the second meeting of the panel without
baptizing them as multiple complainants. Consequently, the Appellate Body
in EC–Hormones opted for a teleological interpretation of the issue taking into
account the case before it and the actual rights that the parties to the dispute
should be accorded so as not to be procedurally prejudiced. It can be deduced
from its reasoning that it based its judgment mainly on Article 10. Initially,
it would seem that it was handling the case as if it were an issue of multiple
complainants even though the Appellate Body later stated that ‘… neither
Canada nor the United States were ordinary third parties in each other’s
complaint’.47 This way, the Appellate Body has identified a category of
litigants which conceptually lies between the multiple complainants and
third parties and has accorded them ‘additional’, ‘enhanced’, ‘extended’ third
party rights beneficiaries’ status. The way this category is formulated does
partly stand on the legal basis of the DSU but, more importantly, – the
Bananas considerations apart – on the concept of due process.
3.  The United States – 1916 Anti-Dumping Act
3.1.  The panel report
The factual background to the case began on 4 June 1998 when the EC
requested consultations with the US that led to the establishment of a Panel
on 1 February 1999. Japan reserved the right to participate as a third party
in the proceedings. Japan requested the establishment of its own Panel pro-
ceedings on 4 June 1999. In WT/DS136 (EC’s complaint), the first substantive
meeting of the parties took place on 13–14 July 1999, the second on 14–15
September 1999, the interim Report was issued on 20 December 1999 and
the Final Report on 14 February 2000. In WT/DS162 (Japan’s complaint),
the first substantive meeting of the parties took place on 3–4 November 1999,
the second on 8–9 December 1999, the Panel issued its interim report on
28 February 2000 and its Final Report on 31 March 2000. In the course of
these proceedings the EC sent a letter to the Chairman of the Panel requesting
enhanced third party rights in Japan’s proceedings on 25 August 1999 and
Japan followed suit on 2 September 1999. 
In US–1916 Anti-Dumping Act (complaint by the EC)48 Japan requested
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46. It seems that it sympathized with the Panel’s choice not to hold the meeting with the scientific
experts twice and two times the same cumbersome procedure of arguments based on an
incomprehensible scientific jargon.
47. Appellate Body report on EC–Hormones, para. 151.
48. WT/DS136/R, at paras. 6.29–6.36.
enhanced third party rights. In particular, it requested to receive all documents
and be present at the second substantive meeting of the Panel.49 The Panel,
after referring to the objections of the USA to the request, declined the
application but promised to reconsider.50 The reasoning the Panel followed
was that although nothing in the DSU provides for the granting of enhanced
third party rights ‘neither Article 10 of the DSU nor any other provision of
the DSU prohibits panels from granting third party rights beyond those
expressly mentioned in Article 1051 and that indeed, enhanced third party
rights formed part of the discretion of the Panel under Article 12.1 of the
DSU’.52 It went further to analyze its own discretion and the reasons that
led it to its decision citing the following factors:53 First, as a statement of
principle, it stated that the DSU differentiates between main parties to the
dispute and third parties. Second, enhanced third party rights were granted
only in specific circumstances, which are (drawing its conclusions from
EC–Hormones):
i) two panels being composed of the same panellists;
ii) two panels dealing with the same matter;
iii) highly technical and factually intensive nature of the cases;
iv) due process.
Points i) and ii) were not found to be decisive because, if they were, rights
should be granted in all cases where the same matter is subject to two or
more complaints with the same Panel composition. The Panel then stressed
that the case before it did not involve the consideration of complex facts or
scientific evidence,54 and made no statement as to whether there were any
considerations of due process except that ‘respecting due process vis-à-vis Japan
did not require the participation of Japan in the second substantive meeting
of the panel’.55 Moreover, it stated that ‘none of the parties requested that
the panels harmonize their timetables or hold concurrent deliberations in
the procedures …’56 and that ‘… the provisions of Article 9 of the DSU, in
particular Article 9.3 which addresses the situation of this Panel and the
Panel requested by Japan on the same matter (WT/DS162) are of limited
assistance in the present issue’.57 In conclusion, the Panel found ‘no reason
to grant enhanced third party rights to Japan in these proceedings’.58
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49. Id. para. 6.29.
50. Id. para. 6.31.
51. Id. para. 6.32. 
52. Id. Citing also in support the Appellate Body Report on EC–Hormones para. 154.
53. Ibid., para. 6.33.
54. Id. para. 6.34.
55. Id. para. 6.35.
56. Id.
57. Ibid., at note 310.
58. Ibid., para. 6.35.
In US–1916 Anti-Dumping Act (complaint by Japan)59 the EC’s applica-
tion to be granted enhanced third party rights bore the same conceptual
and procedural content as Japan’s. The Panel declined it using more or less
the same reasoning. However, there is one paragraph in its report that
resurrects the argument of due process and makes the omission of proper
scrutiny by the Panel manifest. At para. 6.28 of the Report the Panel stated:
‘However, whenever the claims and arguments of the parties raise issues
identical to those addressed by the Panel in WT/DS136, we will apply
the same reasoning as has been applied by the Panel in WT/DS136.’
Taking into account the chronology of the dispute analyzed above, the first
and second substantive meetings of the Panel in WT/DS162 took place
when the Panel was preparing its interim report in case WT/DS136.60
Accordingly, if the Panel did what it admitted having done in the preceding
paragraph, the arguments Japan made in support of claims identical to the
EC’s were in vain since its case had been decided earlier. Even more, it was
more to the detriment of the US as respondent, because its arguments in
defence of the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act were not taken into account since
those claims had already been decided. This scenario can become even worse
if, supposing that the Panel took into account the arguments of the US
when it was writing its report on the complaint by the EC, the latter has
been unable to respond on those. In a nutshell, the Panel completely failed
to acknowledge the considerations of due process epitomized above. This is
surprising since the factual particularities of the case pose much a greater
risk for procedural prejudice than EC–Hormones.
3.2.  The Appellate Body decision
The EC and Japan jointly61 appealed against the decision of the Panel not
to grant them enhanced third party rights in each other’s case. They asked
the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel’s findings and reasoning, in partic-
ular with respect to the proper interpretation of Article 9.3 of the DSU.62
According to them, this case was identical to EC–Hormones63 in three respects:
i) the two proceedings dealt with the same matter, ii) the same panellists
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59. WT/DS162/R, United States–Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (complaint by Japan).
60. In fact, the second substantive meeting of the Panel in WT/DS162 took place on 8–9 December
1999 and the interim report in WT/DS136 was issued 11 days later.
61. From that moment on Japan and the EC have coordinated and functioned as multiple com-
plainants (Appeal, Article 21.3 DSU arbitration).
62. WT/DS136/AB/R and WT/DS162/AB/R Appellate Body Report on US–1916 Anti-Dumping
Act, para. 38. 
63. WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, EC–Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), paras. 150–154.
were serving in both disputes and iii) the proceedings were held concurrently.64
In addition, if the matter was simply one of the Panel’s discretion according
to Article 12.1 DSU this discretion should be exercised on the basis of
principles reflected in Articles 9 and 10 of the DSU, taking account of the
need to respect due process.65 The response of the United States was that
the European Communities and Japan were not prejudiced in this case since
they had prevailed in every substantive argument before the Panel.66 In
addition, it more or less reiterated the arguments accepted by the Panel in
both cases with an emphasis on the issue of concurrent deliberations.67
The Appellate Body started by citing the rules relating to third party
participation in the Panel proceedings namely Article 10 DSU and para-
graph 6 of Appendix 3.68 It then went on to dismiss Article 9 and in particular
9.3 of the DSU as irrelevant since it does not address the issue of the rights
of third parties in such proceedings, but the procedure for multiple com-
plainants.69 Without any further analysis it stated: ‘Under the DSU, as it
currently stands, third parties are only entitled to the participatory rights
provided for in Articles 10.2 and 10.3 and paragraph 6 of Appendix 3.’70
While it seemed that the Appellate Body limited itself to a restrictive yet
dogmatic interpretation of the provisions, it went on to analyze its discre-
tionary powers under the DSU in an attempt to reconcile the DSU with its
previous jurisprudence. Accordingly, after citing Article 12.1 DSU it recited
excerpts from the Panel reasoning distinguishing thereby the present case from
the one in EC–Hormones because the latter entailed consideration of complex
facts or scientific evidence and the timetable was harmonized while the former
did not.71 It then quoted itself in EC–Hormones72 and said that this matter
falls within the discretionary authority of the Panel, which ‘is, of course,
not unlimited and is circumscribed, for example, by the requirements of
due process’.73 It concluded by saying that in the present cases the European
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64. WT/DS136/AB/R and WT/DS162/AB/R, Appellate Body Report on US–1916 Anti-Dumping
Act, para. 38. 
65. Ibid., para. 39.
66. Ibid., para. 42. Nevertheless, the United States do not refer to potential prejudice suffered by
them as pointed out above.
67. Ibid., para. 43. See also on the issue of concurrent deliberations US–1916 Anti-Dumping Act
(complaint by Japan) paras 6.27, 6.33.
68. Ibid., paras 140–143.
69. Ibid., para. 144.
70. Ibid., para. 145.
71. Ibid., para. 148.
72. Ibid., para. 149. Supra note 63, at para. 154: ‘Although Article 12.1 and Appendix 3 of the
DSU do not specifically require the Panel to grant … [‘enhanced’ third party rights] to the
United States, we believe that this decision falls within the sound discretion and authority of
the Panel, particularly if the Panel considers it necessary for ensuring to all parties due process
of law’.
73. Ibid., para. 150.
Communities and Japan have not shown that the Panel exceeded the limits
of its discretionary authority.74
4.  Comment
4.1.  Understanding the Appellate Body’s reasoning
Even on the basis of a cursory look at the Appellate Body’s reasoning in this
case, its analysis looks unsatisfactory. The Appellate Body unfortunately limited
itself to a compilation of citations.75 It is acknowledged that although the Panel
and Appellate Body practice does not have the function of stare decisis in
the WTO legal system it provides guidance for future cases.76 It is obvious
both from the Panel and Appellate Body reports that the cross-appellants based
their arguments on this kind of precedent, the EC–Hormones case. The
Appellate Body expressly referred to it in its reasoning and it may be of
assistance in understanding the reasoning behind this case. What the Appellate
Body did in this case was to take up the underlying policy consideration
employed by it (in a different composition) in the EC–Hormones case and
elevate it into a statement of principle. While in EC–Hormones the state-
ment of principle was to safeguard the procedural rights of the parties and
observe due process77 and the policy consideration the economy of effort,78
in this case, the policy consideration – since the Panel’s choice was upheld
– became the statement of principle. Indeed, because of this distortion, it is
perceived that the reason for granting enhanced third party rights to Canada
and the US in each other’s cases was complex scientific evidence and the like.79
By reasoning in this way the Appellate Body failed to take into account
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74. Id.
75. Out of the 12 paragraphs of its decision only in paras 144 and 150 does it actually say
something. But again, in those paragraphs it just speaks aphorisms on the irrelevance of Article
9 and the inability of EC and Japan to show that the Panel did not respect due process at the
exercise of its discretion. 
76. John H. Jackson, The World Trading System, (MIT Press, 2nd Edition, 1997) pp. 122–124.
This is confirmed in WTO practice already from Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R WT/DS11/AB/R, at p. 24 where the Appellate Body declared
that the rulings of the Panels and Appellate Body, although not binding, create legitimate
expectations. Probably this is the reason that third-party intervention became so popular. It
can be submitted that one of the basic reasons for the big players (EC, US, Japan and Canada)
to intervene is so as to help shape the law they will be bound by in the future. For an
excellent analysis see David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘The WTO Legal System: Sources
of Law’, (1998) 92 AJIL 398.
77. For a presumption that due process is an essential element of the WTO Dispute Settlement see
Cottier, supra note 7 at p. 370.
78. Supra note 46.
79. US–1916 Anti-Dumping Act (complaint by Japan), at para. 6.34 and US–1916 Anti-Dumping
Act (complaint by EC), at para. 6.34.
either considerations of due process or calls for internal transparency. It
dismissed the case in a very brief fashion when, at least, obvious issues of
procedural fairness80 should have been addressed.
4.2.  Enhanced third party rights and the DSU – Is there a margin for 
4.2. discretion?
The name awarded to broader participatory rights is deceiving and is partly
to blame for some misunderstandings on the nature of the obligations incum-
bent upon the Panels in the exercise of their discretion. Indeed, because of
the emphasis on ‘third party’ the analysis usually starts from Article 10 DSU
and proceeds to the assessment of the content of those rights against Article
10.3 DSU and Appendix 3 paragraph 6. The Panels, on the basis of their
Article 12.1 DSU discretion, may grant extended rights when the require-
ments of due process and the interests and rights of the parties so dictate.
The discretion is exercised in accordance with past GATT practice and early
WTO jurisprudence culminating in the Appellate Body Report on
EC–Hormones.81 In particular, Article 10.3 clarifies that third parties ‘shall’
submit their observations during the first substantive meeting of the Panel and
will be heard during that meeting. The language used in this Article regarding
their submissions however, is not prohibitive towards third parties receiving
the submissions made by the main parties at subsequent meetings.82 In
accordance with the negotiating history of the provision and in particular with
the Improvements Decision,83 which was adopted during the mid-term review
of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the corresponding provision reads:
‘3. At the request of the third contracting party, the panel may grant the
third contracting party access to the written submissions to the panel
by those parties to the dispute which have agreed to the disclosure
of their respective submission to the third contracting party.’
This however, represents a limited understanding of enhanced third party
rights since it only mentions the entitlement to the written submissions of the
parties at the second substantive meeting with the Panel and in addition, it
requires their consent. This interpretation is consistent with the DSU for
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80. See supra.
81. Appellate Body Report on EC–Hormones, para. 154.
82. F. Weiss, ‘Optimising the Dispute Settlement Procedure (a European Position)’, in Antonio
Pérez van Kappel and Heusel Wolfgang (eds.), Free World Trade and the European Union: the
reconciliation of interests and the review of the Understanding on Dispute Settlement in the
Framework of the World Trade Organization (Series of Publications by the Academy of European
Law in Trier; Vol. 28), Köln 2000, at p. 85.
83. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Decisions Adopted at the Mid-Term Review of the
Uruguay Round, 8 April 1989, 28 ILM 1023 (1989).
ordinary third parties but does not effectively address the issues raised in
cases like EC–Hormones and US–1916 Anti-Dumping Act. 
In this category of cases the starting point should be Article 9 DSU. In
its ordinary practice, when more than one Member of the Organization request
the establishment of a Panel on the same matter they act as multiple com-
plainants. This is subject to procedural limitations; a single Panel should be
established wherever feasible84 and when more than one panel is established,
to the greatest extent possible, the same members shall serve as panellists
and the timetable shall be harmonized.85 The broader participatory rights
enjoyed by every multiple complainant include the right to receive the written
submissions of the other multiple complainants and to be present when any
one of the other complainants presents its views to the panel.86 It is diffi-
cult to see why Article 9 DSU should not apply directly in US–1916
Anti-Dumping Act. The wording of Article 9 is supportive of this thesis.
First, its language is permissive as to the single panel requirement.87 Second,
the stress is put on the procedural rights of the parties (‘rights which parties
to the dispute would have enjoyed’). Third, there is no time constraint for
its application. In fact, the only requirement is that more than two Members
request the establishment of a Panel on the same matter.88 Fourth, the
timetable harmonization in multiple-Panel situations is informed by the
provision ‘to the greatest extent possible’.89 Most importantly, the content
of multiple complainants’ rights is also identified in Article 9.2 of the DSU
and this is identical to the rights accorded in the EC–Hormones case.
The grant of Article 9.2 DSU rights can be arrived at from a different route.
In particular, Article 10.4 DSU codified the GATT process followed in cases
where the Contracting Parties, already third parties to a dispute, discovered
that benefits under the GATT Agreement were nullified or impaired due to
the measure under scrutiny and opted to initiate their own proceedings.90 This
is the key provision in an analysis of cases of ‘parallel but not joined com-
plaints’.91 There have been some doubts as to whether the phrases ‘already
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84. Article 9.1 DSU.
85. Article 9.3 DSU.
86. Article 9.2 DSU.
87. Panel Report on India–Patent Protection for Pharmaceutican and Agricultural Chemical Products
(complaint by the EC), at para. 7.14.
88. Ibid., at para. 7.16. See also A. W. Shoyer, ‘The First Three Years of the WTO Dispute
Settlement: Observations and Suggestions’, (1998) 1 JIEL 277, at p. 293 where he proposes,
influenced by the NAFTA, that a third party not joining the case within the time limit provided
should refrain from initiating its own proceedings.
89. It is doubtful whether timetable harmonization means simultaneous adjudication as the Panel
in US–1916 Anti-Dumping Act suggests.
90. E.g. United States–Restrictions on Imports of Sugar where the EEC participated as third party to
the proceedings and later on it initiated its own in United States–Restrictions on the Importation
of Sugar and Sugar-containing products under the 1955 Waiver. 
91. Cottier, supra note 7, at footnote 50.
the subject of a panel proceeding’ and ‘original panel’ in Article 10.4 meant
that the Panel should have issued its report but the Panel in India–Patent
put those doubts to rest and gave a broad interpretation to the temporal aspect
of the provision.92 It is important to note that Article 10.4 provides that
‘that Member shall have recourse to normal dispute settlement proceedings’.
The sentence ‘normal dispute settlement proceedings’ certainly refers to the
DSU. Accordingly, and since Article 9 forms part of the normal dispute set-
tlement proceedings of the DSU, Article 9.2 rights should be granted to the
third party promoted to multiple complainant status. As far as the limita-
tions are concerned, since Article 10.4 provides for its own limitations in
this case which includes only resort to the original panel, the third party is
relieved from timetable harmonization.
As a result, the Panels have no actual discretion to accord the rights referred
to in Article 9.2 of the DSU to parties to the dispute that are not ordinary
third parties.93 Especially when due process considerations are raised, the Panels
should grant those rights to the parties. The content of third party rights
and the Panel’s discretion in favour of according full participatory rights in
those cases can also be influenced by a look at other international tribunals,
namely the International Court of Justice,94 the NAFTA Court95 and the
European Court of Justice96 where full procedural rights are guaranteed to
the intervening parties and their model could prove very helpful in a poten-
tial reform of the DSU. 
5.  Conclusions
It can be opined on the basis of the above that the methodology of the
involvement of third parties in proceedings should go as follows: when a
request for the establishment of a Panel is made by a WTO Member, any other
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92. Panel Report on India–Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products
(complaint by the EC) at para. 7.20.
93. Appellate Body Report on EC–Hormones, at para. 151.
94. Already from the Appellate Body Report on United States–Standards for reformulated and 
conventional gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R and regularly thereafter the Appellate Body refers to the
International Court of Justice as a source of inspiration. Indicatively on the issue of third party
rights see Nick Covelli, ‘Public International Law and Third Party Participation in WTO
Proceedings’, (1999) 33 JWT 125. Also in this context, David Palmeter, ‘The Need for Due
Process in WTO Proceedings’, (1997) 31 JWT 51. 
95. Gabrielle Marceau, ‘NAFTA and WTO Dispute Settlement Rules: A Thematic Comparison’,
(1997) 31 JWT 25. In accordance with Article 2013 of the NAFTA Treaty third party rights
include the right to attend the right to attend all hearings and to make written and oral
submissions.
96. Article 37 of the Court’s Rules of procedure allows full participatory rights to the intervening
parties. See R. Plender, ‘Procedure in the European Courts’, (1997) 267 Recueil des Cours 1 at
p. 67. 
Member with an interest in the dispute may intervene as a third party. The
procedural rights accorded to third parties are limited to those specifically
prescribed in Article 10.3 and Appendix 3 paragraph 6 DSU. They can be
extended if the Panel so decides in the exercise of its discretion. If a third party
opts to initiate its own proceedings, it will be joined to the proceedings in
a single panel whenever feasible. The procedural rights accorded to the third
party elevated to multiple complainant status are those prescribed in Article
9.2 and extend to the availability of all written submissions, presence in all
meetings with the Panel and the right to present its views to the Panel. The
procedural rights to be enjoyed by a third party in the eventuality that it
initiates its own proceedings on the same matter, but its joinder in a single
Panel proves unfeasible, should be extended to the same rights provided for
in Article 9.2 DSU whose correct interpretation suggests that those parties are
also multiple complainants for the purposes of Article 9. Eventually, if the
analysis of Articles 9 and 10 DSU is correct, the term ‘enhanced third party
rights’ becomes partly superfluous and redundant and should be comple-
mented with the term ‘rights of multiple but separate complainants’.
The DSU is prone to this interpretation and it is regrettable that the
Appellate Body distinguished EC–Hormones on the issue. The matter will
increasingly reveal its systemic importance, especially in cases involving many
complainants.97 An ongoing dispute between the United States and the rest
of the world on the former’s decision to impose tariffs on steel products98
will evince the defects of the Appellate Body reasoning. Until now, in the
dispute initiated by the EC,99 Korea, Japan,100 Switzerland, Norway, China101
and New Zealand102 were joined as multiple complainants in a single Panel.
Two more Members, Brazil103 and Mexico have already joined consultations.
If and when they request the establishment of a Panel, it may not be feasible
for them to be joined in the single Panel already established neither to
harmonize the timetable. In this case, they should be granted the broader
participatory rights enshrined in Article 9.2 DSU.
Reiterating the policy considerations set out in the introduction, the role
of the Appellate Body in resolving the identity crisis looming in the WTO
becomes fundamental. The contentious problems should be resolved with due
regard to the intellectual underpinnings of the multilateral trading system and
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97. No solution is found in the case of multiple defendants where the DSU is silent. See Allan
Rosas, ‘Joinder of Parties and Third Party Intervention in WTO Dispute Settlement’, in Friedl
Weiss (ed.), Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues and Lessons from the Practice
of Other International Courts and Tribunals (Cameron May, 2000).
98. United States–Definite Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products.
99. WT/DS248
100. Decision by the Dispute Settlement Body, 14 June 2002.
101. Decision by the Dispute Settlement Body, 24 June 2002.
102. Decision by the Dispute Settlement Body, 8 July 2002.
103. DS/WT258.
the legal texts. If norm elasticity is employed to open up the Dispute
Settlement to non-Members, it is imperative to do so for WTO Members with
a presumed substantial interest in the dispute. Also, if full participation of
the WTO Members in its proceedings is the objective, it can be achieved
by means of procedural flexibility especially where the wording of the pro-
visions so dictates. Generally speaking, it is a systemic paradox that the NGOs
– whose importance as expression of international civil society’s input in global
governance is ever-increasing – are afforded the maximum possible consid-
eration104 while the Members of the Organization are not granted the
possibility of attending a hearing of a Panel on a dispute directly affecting
their interests.105 However, in an era of transition in the formulation of
global governance the calls for democracy and transparency are very timely.
The openness to everybody of all decision-making (including jurispruden-
tial) should be guaranteed. In this vein, a modest proposal would be the
amendment of the DSU so as to allow third parties to have full access to
all documents, attend all stages of the proceedings and make submissions,106
while a more ambitious proposal should aspire to make the WTO Dispute
Settlement public. 
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